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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A 
NEW APPROACH TO THE REASONABLE AND 
BONA FIDE EXPENDITURE DEFENSE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since United States v. Kay1 was decided in 2004, enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 (FCPA or the Act) has significantly 
increased, putting companies on notice that the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) intend to 
aggressively pursue violators.3 The agencies brought more indictments 
against individuals in 2009 alone than in the previous seven years 
combined.4 As of 2010, there were an estimated 140 open FCPA 
investigations, with fines reaching record levels.5 Increasing enforcement 
actions, together with the FCPA’s vague wording, a broad interpretation of 
the statutory language,6 and a dearth of court decisions,7 have resulted in an 
overly cautious international business community.8 In attempting to ensure 
that their companies do not land on the DOJ’s or SEC’s radars, businesses 
are rejecting legitimate opportunities.9 
The FCPA’s increasingly high-profile status has led to examinations of 
its various elements.  Most frequently examined are the definitions of 
several key terms such as “foreign official,” “obtaining or retaining 
business,” “corruptly,” and “thing of value.”10 However, there has been 
very little exploration of the FCPA’s two affirmative defenses, in particular, 
the “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense.11 Arguably, this is 
because the defense is ephemeral and the majority of enforcement actions 
end in deferred or non-prosecutorial agreements.12 In theory, the defense 
allows companies to pay costs associated with promoting their products, 
such as travel and hotel fees that foreign officials incur while attending 
promotional events.13 However, no clear guidelines defining a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 1. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 78dd-1 to 
78dd-3, 78ff (2006). 
 3. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 95 (2007). 
 4. Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New UK 
Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of Foreign 
Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 845, 853–54 (2011). 
 5. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly 
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 496 (2011). 
 6. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 965 (2010). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 925.  
 9. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 498.  
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), (f)(1)(A) (2006). 
 11. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
 12. Koehler, supra note 6, at 933–34. 
 13. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
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expenditure currently exist. Without specific guidance, companies rely on 
the DOJ’s and SEC’s recently published Resource Guide to the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Resource Guide),14 DOJ Opinion Procedure 
Releases, and practitioners’ deductions about acceptable expenditures.15 In 
sum, businesses are forced to make educated guesses as to whether their 
promotional expenditures comply with the FCPA. 
The greater problem, as this note argues, results when the lack of a clear 
standard leads to disparate results in factually similar cases, as illustrated by 
the divergent fines imposed on UTStarcom Inc. (UTSI) and Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. (Lucent). Although both companies engaged in similar 
violations, UTSI paid a higher fine than Lucent, notwithstanding the fact 
that Lucent spent more money on foreign official travel.16 If the DOJ 
articulated and codified a clear rule for determining what expenditures are 
“reasonable and bona fide,” which the Resource Guide explicitly fails to 
do,17 the defense’s limitations would be better understood. A rule would 
prevent future attempts to mask questionable expenditures18 behind the 
defense, while protecting companies making legitimate expenditures from 
DOJ or SEC action. Importantly, this clarity would allow decisions to be 
made at the speed of business, instead of waiting for DOJ Opinion 
Procedures. The resulting flexibility would achieve the defense’s ultimate 
goals of promoting legitimate business opportunities while simultaneously 
ensuring equitable punishment for violators. 
In Part I, this note provides background on the FCPA and the roles of 
the DOJ and SEC, as well as on the Act’s most important elements. Part II 
reviews the “greasing provision” and the two affirmative defenses. Part III 
addresses the dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement and the reasons 
diversion agreements increase the FCPA’s ambiguity.19 Part IV discusses 
the implications of the absence of DOJ guidance and case law on the 
affirmative defenses, particularly the “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure” defense. Part V discusses the advantages of a rule-based 
system instead of the current standards-based FCPA construction. This 
note’s proposed system envisages a rule modeled on the existing per diem 
structure currently in place for government employee travel.20 As the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 15. See Shari A. Brown & Brian S. Chilton, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 BRIEFLY… 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGIS., REG. & LITIG., May 2007, at 1, 35–39. 
 16. Koehler, supra note 6, at 989.  
 17. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 24.  
 18. Koehler, supra note 6, at 984–90. 
 19. Koehler, supra note 6, at 933–39; see also Lauren Giudice, Comment, Regulating 
Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 348, 362–68 (2011) (providing background and exploration of the various critiques 
and rationales for the use of prosecution agreements). 
 20. Per Diem Rates, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104877 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
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section discusses, a rule-based system would facilitate the legitimate use of 
the defense and encourage pursuit of business opportunities abroad without 
fear of running afoul of the FCPA. 
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. ELEMENTS OF THE FCPA 
The FCPA was enacted as an amendment to the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act after reports emerged that U.S. companies were making 
improper payments to foreign officials domestically and abroad.21 The Act 
prohibits bribery of foreign officials done to “obtain or retain” business and 
encompasses “U.S. persons and corporations, companies with publicly 
traded securities in the United States, and anyone who happens to be in U.S. 
territory.”22 Individuals and corporations covered by the Act may not 
“offer—either directly or indirectly—with a corrupt intent, anything of 
value to any foreign official for the purpose of ‘obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.’”23 
The FCPA has been amended twice, in 1988 and again in 1998.24 The 
first amendment added the affirmative defenses and expanded the Act’s 
scope to capture prohibited conduct occurring outside of the United States. 
The modifications made it possible to reach foreign corporations and 
persons who violate the FCPA while in the United States and clarified what 
it means to secure the type of “improper advantages” prohibited by the 
Act.25 The 1998 amendment implemented the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s  Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.26 
The FCPA has two separate provisions: the accounting provisions and 
the anti-bribery provisions.27 The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange 
Act to add record-keeping and disclosure requirements for companies 
subject to the Securities Exchange Act.28 Corporations that either offer a 
class of securities requiring registration or are required to file reports under 
the Securities Exchange Act must comply with the FCPA’s accounting 
provisions, which are enforced by the SEC.29 The accounting provisions 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Jennifer D. Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 861–62 (2001); Westbrook, 
supra note 5, at 500.  
 22. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 500–01.  
 23. Giudice, supra note 19, at 355 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)). 
 24. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 502. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 5.  
 28. Pamela J. Jadwin & Monica Shilling, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 677, 679 (1994). 
 29. Taylor, supra note 21, at 863.  
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state, “No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to 
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify 
any book, record, or account . . . .”30 The regulations further require that 
issuers “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer” and that companies also “devise and maintain a system 
of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” 
of properly authorized transactions.31 The provision aims to deter illegal 
business practices such as creating “off-the-books ‘slush funds’” or 
misrepresenting the nature of a commercial transaction.32 The record-
keeping provisions ensure that transactions are properly recorded and that 
businesses are accountable for any differences in recorded and actual 
assets.33 The Act’s requirements of “reasonable assurances” and 
“reasonable detail” are interpreted as a “level of detail and degree of 
assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own 
affairs.”34 
The DOJ administers the anti-bribery provisions,  which are intended to 
deter bribery that occurs in an attempt to gain a competitive edge when 
conducting business with foreign government officials.35 The Act’s 
carefully worded but sweeping language applies to “issuers,”36 “domestic 
concerns,”37 and “any person”38 who violates the FCPA regardless of 
whether that person is a U.S. resident or doing business in the United 
States. It further prohibits use of the mail or other means of commerce to: 
(1) corruptly; (2) offer, pay, promise to pay, or authorize payment of money 
or anything of value; (3) to a foreign official; (4) to influence the foreign 
official’s actions or decisions in his official capacity, or to secure an 
improper advantage; and (5) to obtain or retain business.39 
The Act also prohibits willful blindness and imposes vicarious liability. 
An FCPA charge may be based on an intermediary’s or subsidiary’s act, 
and the government need not demonstrate either that the company was 
aware of or ordered the action.40 Instead, liability under the FCPA requires 
only that the company’s executives were willfully blind to red flags 
indicating that the subsidiary was either engaging in, or would probably 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2006). 
 31. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
 32. Taylor, supra note 21, at 863. 
 33. Id.  
 34. § 78m(b)(7). 
 35. Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act— 1977 to 2010, 
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 94 (2010). 
 36. § 78dd-1(a). 
 37. § 78dd-2(a). 
 38. § 78dd-3(a). 
 39. See Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 5; see also § 78dd-1. 
 40. See Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 19.  
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engage in, illegal behavior.41 If a corporate executive ignores a third party’s 
action, the official could still be liable if the executive’s behavior implies 
knowledge of the actions.42  Further, the executive will also be responsible 
if he tacitly condoned the payment despite not possessing actual knowledge 
that it occurred.43 This approach produces a problematic result when senior 
executives without knowledge of discreetly made payments, particularly by 
a third parties, are still held liable under the FCPA despite a lack of red 
flags or implied knowledge. The majority of enforcement actions against 
U.S. issuers or domestic concerns result from a third party’s illegal 
actions.44 Often, the third party is aware it is violating the company’s anti-
bribery provisions but believes its actions are the only way to obtain 
business in that country and does not inform the issuer of the payment.45 
B. THE AMBIGUOUS ELEMENTS 
Most of the FCPA’s language is quite broad and certain elements are 
particularly controversial. The majority of discussion has centered around 
who qualifies as a “foreign official,” what it means to “obtain or retain” 
business, and determining when a gift is a “thing of value.”46 This section 
of the note briefly explores the debate and accepted interpretations of these 
phrases. 
1. Who Is a “Foreign Official”? 
The FCPA defines a “foreign official” as 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf 
of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for 
or on behalf of any such public international organization.47 
                                                                                                                 
 41.  
[T]he government can establish a company’s “corrupt” intent to act through the 
intermediary through a “willful blindness” standard rather than requiring proof of 
“actual knowledge,” such that the government need prove only that a company knew of 
facts (often referred to as “red flags”) indicating a likelihood that the intermediary 
would engage in prohibited behavior, and then consciously or deliberately took steps to 
avoid learning whether the intermediary was engaging, or had engaged in, prohibited 
conduct. 
Id. at 18. 
 42. Jadwin & Shilling, supra note 28, at 682–83.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 18–19.  
 45. Id.  
 46. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 914–17.  
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f)(1)(A) (2006). 
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Although the term “foreign official” is crucial to enforcing the FCPA, a 
court has never evaluated the current interpretation.48 As a result, the DOJ 
and SEC have the freedom to define it to best suit their goals. Similarly, the 
Resource Guide fails to offer a conclusive definition but notes that the 
application is broad.49 The Act clearly applies to foreign officials who serve 
in governmental ministries but has also been extended to include employees 
of foreign state-owned enterprises (SOE) because they are 
“instrumentalities” of the foreign government.50 This poses a particular 
problem in certain fields such as “defense contracting, telecommunications, 
or airline manufacturing, where a company has all the attributes of a private 
enterprise, but on closer scrutiny demonstrates governmental ownership or 
control.”51 An employee may be considered a foreign official when he 
either holds a parallel position with the government in addition to having 
private sector responsibilities or where the employer is considered an 
“instrumentality” of a foreign government.52 Although not an exhaustive 
list, the DOJ and SEC will consider (1) the government’s extent of control 
over the organization and its characterization of the entity and the 
employees, (2) circumstances surrounding its creation and its obligations or 
privileges, (3) any financial support it receives, and (4) the perception that 
the entity is engaging in official business.53 The DOJ and SEC additionally 
note that although an organization is unlikely to be considered an 
instrumentality if the government does not own or control a majority of the 
shares in the company, it might still be an SOE if the government has a 
close relationship with the company.54 If a company is considered an 
“instrumentality,” then all of its employees are considered “foreign 
officials” for FCPA purposes regardless of their positions in the company.55 
As a result, a company subject to the FCPA must make a careful inquiry 
into the target industry’s affiliations as well as the particular background of 
the employee with whom it is conducting business. 
2. What Does It Mean To “Obtain or Retain” Business? 
To individuals unfamiliar with the FCPA, its prohibition on bribing officials 
in order to “obtain or retain” business would appear to relate only to those 
actions directly intended to procure contracts.56  The Fifth Circuit’s decision 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 916.  
 49. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.  
 50. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 916.  
 51. Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 11.  
 52. Id. 
 53. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20. 
 54. Id. at 20–21.  
 55. Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 11–12.  
 56. Jonathan N. Rosen, FCPA Enforcement Actions: Managing Risks in the Global 
Marketplace, DRI FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2010, at 58, 61 n.10. 
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in United States v. Kay,57 demonstrated that this interpretation of the 
FCPA’s clause is incorrect.58 In Kay, the president and vice president of a 
Houston-based company were indicted for anti-bribery violations.59 The 
indictment alleged that the defendants made improper payments to Haitian 
foreign officials in order to reduce customs duties and sales taxes.60 The 
indictment did not present facts demonstrating how the company either 
obtained or retained business based on the reduced duties, but the DOJ 
argued that favorable tax treatment was within the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
scope.61 In deciding the case, the court’s analysis relied heavily on 
legislative intent because of the provision’s ambiguity.62 The court found 
that Congress intended to prevent payments broader than those simply 
influencing the acquisition or retention of government contracts.63 It held 
that payments to a foreign official to lower taxes can sometimes provide an 
unfair advantage to the payor over competitors and result in obtaining or 
retaining business.64 However, the court limited its holding by recognizing 
that there would be circumstances in which making a payment to reduce 
taxes would not fall within the FCPA’s scope.65 Nonetheless, Kay prompted 
enforcement agencies to aggressively target companies that made payments 
involving customs duties and taxes.66 Based on Kay, companies must 
consider whether they may incur liability under the FCPA through indirect 
benefits their companies obtain and not simply direct benefits.  
3. What Is a “Thing of Value”?   
One of the FCPA’s crucial provisions is its prohibition on providing 
money or a “thing of value” to foreign officials.67 Though the FCPA does 
not define the phrase “thing of value” nor provide a de minimis exception,68 
courts have looked to the subjective value the defendant places on the item 
rather than its monetary worth in applying the standard.69 For example, in 
United States v. Liebo,70 the Eighth Circuit found that an airline ticket was a 
                                                                                                                 
 57. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 58. Rosen, supra note 56.  
 59. Koehler, supra note 6, at 918.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Kay, 359 F.3d at 755–57; see also Koehler, supra note 6, at 919.  
 63. Kay, 359 F.3d at 756. 
 64. Id. at 759–60; see also Koehler, supra note 6, at 920.  
 65. Kay, 359 F.3d at 760; see Koehler, supra note 6, at 920.  
 66. Koehler, supra note 6, at 920; Rosen, supra note 56, at 61 (discussing the DOJ’s 
prosecution of Helerich & Payne, Inc. for improper payments to customs officials in Argentina 
and Venezuela to expedite importation and exportation of materials).  
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 68. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 14–15.  
 69. Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 9.  
 70. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14 (discussing United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th 
Cir. 1991), as an example of an airline ticket being a “thing of value” within the meaning of the 
statute). 
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thing of value. Additionally, the Resource Guide indicates that spending 
$10,000 when entertaining government officials is improper because the 
“larger or more extravagant the gift . . . the more likely it was given with an 
improper purpose.”71 Further, a properly recorded donation to a legitimate 
charity may be a thing of value if a government official is actively involved 
with the charity and subjectively valued the donations.72 As a result, when 
making expenditures, corporate executives must consider not only the 
objective value of the expenditure but also whether it will induce the 
government official to assist the company, thereby evincing a corrupt 
intent. 
II. EXCEPTION AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The Act’s exception and affirmative defenses give businesses some 
latitude when operating overseas or negotiating with foreign governments. 
However, these exceptions and defenses are of limited use because of their 
narrow interpretations or vague language. 
A. EXCEPTION: FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
The Act includes one exception to allow “grease” payments to foreign 
government officials to facilitate the performance of routine duties, which 
are enumerated as 
obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person 
to do business in a foreign country; processing governmental papers, such 
as visas and work orders; providing police protection, mail pick-up and 
delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance 
or inspections related to transit of goods across country; providing phone 
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or 
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or 
actions of a similar nature.73 
This exception enables U.S. businesses operating overseas to obtain 
services necessary for conducting daily operations that might not occur 
without small facilitation payments. There is no official maximum amount 
for grease payments, but $1,000 appears to be the acceptable limit74 and the 
Resource Guide indicates that a large payment “is more suggestive of 
corrupt intent to influence a non-routine governmental action.”75 When the 
exception is invoked, the government’s analysis focuses on whether the 
money was used to achieve the performance of a routine governmental 
                                                                                                                 
 71. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 15–16.  
 72. See SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 18740, 82 SEC Docket 
3732 (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm; Koehler, 
supra note 6, at 915. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(i)–(v) (2006). 
 74. Bixby, supra note 35, at 110. 
 75. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 25. 
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action. This exception will not apply where the official was required to use 
his discretion or perform a nonroutine task.76 As such, courts focus on the 
purpose of the payment, not its value.77 When the exception is invoked, the 
burden is on the government to show that it does not apply.78 However, 
when the facilitation payment was intended as a bribe, then the payment 
may violate the FCPA even if it would have otherwise qualified as a grease 
payment.79 In effect, the facilitation payment does not act as a de minimis 
exception to the anti-bribery provisions.80  
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The FCPA incorporates two affirmative defenses. The first, known as 
the “local law defense,”81 allows for “the payment, gift, offer, or promise of 
anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and 
regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or 
candidate’s country.”82 To employ this defense, the law regarding payments 
or gifts must be codified and not simply culturally expected.83 This defense 
has limited application, however, because if such payments are acceptable 
in the host country, their permissibility is unlikely to be codified.84 
The second affirmative defense allows “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditures” to enable corporations to pay a foreign official’s legitimate 
travel expenses, such as hotel stays, when the expenses are associated with 
promoting a product or service.85 The language provides that expenses may 
be paid if the expense 
was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging 
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party 
official, or candidate and was directly related to— 
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; 
or 
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government 
or agency thereof.86 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 26.  
 79. See id.  
 80. See id.  
 81. Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and 
United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 433 
(2011). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2006). 
 83. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 425 (1999). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Kyle P. Sheahen, Note, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 466, 478 (2011). 
 86. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
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To be “reasonable and bona fide,” a payment may not be made corruptly.87 
Although not specifically defined, legislative history indicates that a 
payment is corrupt if 
the offer, payment, promise, or gift, [is] intended to induce the recipient to 
misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the 
payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable 
regulation. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose, an 
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not require that the act 
be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome.88 
This provision is not a true affirmative defense, but rather a “safe 
harbor” that permits the company to prove that it did not have a corrupt 
intent when it paid the promotional expenses.89 However, the “bona fide 
expense” defense will not shield a company from liability, even if its 
expenses were legitimate, if the government can prove that the company’s 
intentions were corrupt, and, hence, not “bona fide.”90 The Resource Guide 
states that paying travel and other related expenses to visit company 
facilities, training, product demonstration/promotional activities, and 
meetings are not actionable.91 Further, it provides a list of safeguards 
addressing whether an expenditure might violate the FCPA and notes that 
each payment is individually evaluated.92 
III. THE DRAMATIC INCREASE IN FCPA PROSECUTIONS 
A. FCPA ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
In 2004, the same year as United States v. Kay was decided, the SEC 
and DOJ began aggressively enforcing the FCPA.93 In the years following, 
civil and criminal prosecutions based on novel legal theories used to 
prosecute corporations steadily increased.94 The enthusiasm for FCPA 
prosecutions became more pronounced under the Obama administration, 
which linked corruption with national security issues such as terrorism and 
human, weapons, and drug trafficking.95 
In 2010, the SEC and DOJ brought a record seventy-four enforcement 
actions,96 a sharp increase from the forty brought in 2009,97 with little 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Sheahen, supra note 85, at 478–79.  
 88. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10–11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. 
 89. See Brown & Chilton, supra note 15, at 29.  
 90. See id.  
 91. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 24.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Bixby, supra note 35, at 104. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Mark Brzezinski, Obama Administration Gets Tough on Business Corruption Overseas, 
WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, at A23. 
 96. 2010 Year-end FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2011) http://www.gibsondunn.com 
/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN 2010].  
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indication that prosecution will abate. Echoing the Obama administration’s 
policy position, former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer said, 
“One can say without exaggeration that this past year was probably the 
most dynamic single year in the more than thirty years since the FCPA was 
enacted.”98 
FCPA enforcement actions expanded during 2009 based on several 
developments. These developments included the SEC’s use of new 
enforcement theories, the DOJ’s prosecution of third parties and foreign 
government officials, the DOJ’s and SEC’s encouragement of self 
monitoring, increased prosecution of individuals, and organizational 
changes at the DOJ and SEC.99 Both the DOJ and SEC created task forces 
to uncover FCPA violations.100 Additionally, the DOJ created a squad of 
FBI agents dedicated to pursuing allegations of corruption and developed 
investigative partnerships with agencies such as the Internal Revenue 
Service’s Criminal Investigations Division.101 The DOJ and SEC also 
aggressively targeted individual defendants, particularly senior corporate 
executives.102 Interestingly, although corporations typically choose to avoid 
trial, individual defendants appear to prefer litigation.103 If enforcement 
actions against individuals continue, then one long-term benefit may be an 
increased amount of case law, which will assist companies with interpreting 
the FCPA. 
B. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE FCPA 
Along with more aggressive FCPA enforcement, the penalties and fines 
for such violations have dramatically increased.104 The FCPA’s criminal 
penalties allow the DOJ and SEC to fine corporations and business entities 
up to $2,000,000, while individuals may receive a fine of up to $100,000 
and five years in prison.105 Additionally, under the Alternative Fines Act, 
the actual fine may be twice the benefit that the defendant received from 
making the illicit payment.106 The Attorney General or the SEC may also 
bring a civil action for a fine of up to $10,000 against a company or an 
individual acting on behalf of the company, and the court may impose a 
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fine based on the egregiousness of the violation.107 Finally, the penalties for 
violating the books and records provisions may be a fine of up to 
$25,000,000 for corporations, with $5,000,000 and up to twenty years 
imprisonment for an individual.108 Furthermore, the Alternative Fines Act 
applies to prosecutions conducted under the books and records provisions, 
which may also significantly increase the fines.109 The most serious 
potential consequence for an FCPA violation is that a person or firm a may 
be prohibited from receiving federal government contracts and export 
licenses.110 
Although the stipulated monetary consequences of an FCPA violation 
are significant, they pale in comparison to the actual fines. Fines have 
steadily increased in large part because the penalties now include 
disgorgement of profits.111 The prosecutorial trend of seeking fines in the 
alternative reflects an effort to both deter future violations and to eliminate 
any profits obtained through that specific violation.112 The 2008 Siemens 
AG settlement demonstrates the enormity of potential FCPA-related fines: 
the company settled alleged FCPA violations with the SEC for 
disgorgement of $350 million in profits and with the DOJ for $450 million 
to settle criminal charges—in addition to a $569 million fine levied by the 
German government.113 This $800 million settlement was the largest 
penalty paid in an FCPA case.114 The enormous Siemens AG settlement 
demonstrates that the SEC and DOJ will seek substantial punitive measures 
in this new era of FCPA enforcement. 
C. THE OVERUSE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTORIAL 
AGREEMENTS 
Although the SEC and DOJ are imposing increasingly large fines, the 
theories under which they bring actions are rarely tested because the vast 
majority of cases settle.115 The DOJ’s and SEC’s goal when enforcing the 
FCPA is to reform the company instead of simply punishing it.116 The DOJ 
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relies on the Principles of Federal Prosecution, which sets forth factors 
prosecutors should consider when determining whether to bring charges 
against a business or to negotiate a deferred or non-prosecutorial 
agreement.117 The Principles provide several mitigating factors, such as the 
corporation’s disclosure of the violation and willingness to cooperate with 
an investigation.118 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines places a heavy premium 
on cooperation and disclosure, and cooperation may result in significantly 
lower fines.119 Given that voluntary disclosure carries much lighter 
penalties, corporations typically choose to disclose conduct and agree to the 
DOJ’s terms, even when it is unclear whether the corporation’s actions 
violated the FCPA.120 In fact, although individuals typically proceed to 
litigation, in the last twenty years, no company has challenged an FCPA 
enforcement action.121 
The SEC uses similar cooperation-based incentives to encourage 
companies to disclose conduct that might violate the FCPA.122 The result, as 
with the DOJ’s approach, is that a company may potentially disclose 
conduct that does not violate the FCPA. However, some companies may 
prefer this calculated risk as it avoids the potentially greater cost of 
litigation and its uncertain result.123 
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution 
agreements (DPAs) constitute the two most commonly used tools for 
settling FCPA charges.124 One of the main differences between the two is 
that courts are empowered to review DPAs but not NPAs.125 When the DOJ 
is involved, a DPA requires a defendant to pay a penalty, waive the statute 
of limitations, cooperate, admit certain facts, and implement compliance 
measures. If the company successfully completes the agreement, then the 
charges are dismissed.126 Under an SEC DPA, the SEC agrees to forego an 
enforcement action provided the company meets certain requirements, 
including cooperation with the SEC’s investigation. If the agreement is 
violated, the SEC may recommend an enforcement action and, if 
authorized, may use any admissions the company or individual made in a 
motion for summary judgment.127 However, under an NPA, the DOJ and 
SEC retain the right to bring charges but refrain from filing documents with 
the court in order to allow the company or individual an opportunity to take 
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remedial measures.128 Although diversion agreements avoid the expense of 
litigation, one consequence is that prosecutors have an extensive amount of 
power when drafting the agreements.129 
Although diversion agreements allow the SEC and DOJ to quickly 
settle allegations, the result of their use has been wide-reaching FCPA 
enforcement with little judicial oversight of either the allegations or the 
settlements.130 First, different judicial districts have different policies about 
the acceptable use of diversion agreements, increasing a corporation’s 
uncertainty about whether to challenge the charge.131 Second, it appears that 
individuals and corporations may enter into diversion agreements before 
sufficient facts are established against an individual or entity.132 As a result 
of the DOJ’s and SEC’s use of diversion agreements, businesses are eager 
to quickly resolve any allegations of wrongdoing. Consequently, and 
perhaps due to companies’ increased docility with respect to current 
diversion agreement practice, the DOJ has expanded the definition of 
“foreign officials,” increased prosecution of companies over licensing 
issues, implemented strict liability for the record-keeping provisions, and 
used disgorgement for violations of the accounting provisions.133 
Although diversion agreements present businesses with the opportunity 
to quickly settle a charge, in the long run this might hurt them as the 
parameters for penalties remain unclear. Not only is the statute’s language 
ambiguous, but, should a company determine that it violated the law, it 
cannot anticipate how harshly it will be punished. Further, given the 
premium the agencies place on cooperation, should a company attempt to 
defend its actions, the company will probably be considered uncooperative 
and possibly face stiffer penalties.134 The opaqueness regarding the contours 
of FCPA liability created by current diversion agreement practice hurts 
businesses and undermines the DOJ’s and SEC’s ultimate goal of deterring 
such violations. Accordingly, U.S. companies are less willing to invest 
abroad and many avoid business opportunities in developing countries 
because the cost of a potential FCPA prosecution likely outweighs the 
anticipated profit.135 
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IV. THE DILUTION OF THE “REASONABLE AND BONA FIDE” 
EXPENDITURE DEFENSE 
As discussed above, the FCPA provides two affirmative defenses.136 
The first defense provides that the FCPA does not capture a payment that is 
codified as lawful behavior in the payee country.137 The second defense 
permits expenditures that were made while promoting the company’s 
product, such as hotels or airfare.138 These defenses pose several problems. 
First, to establish a working relationship in certain countries, an FCPA-
prohibited expenditure may be culturally expected; however, it is unlikely 
that the payment’s legality is formalized and so the defense is inoperable.139 
Second, the promotional expenditure defense raises nuanced questions 
about when building rapport and establishing goodwill becomes a bribe. 
Further, there is very little case law to consult. The Resource Guide, 
however, provides general factors that the DOJ will consider when bringing 
enforcement actions.140 On the other hand, the same ambiguity offers a 
potential loophole through which to make illicit payments. The DOJ has 
attempted to address the ambiguity of the promotional expenditure defense 
through its Opinion Procedure Releases, but its strict instructions limit this 
tool’s utility. 
A. DOJ OPINION PROCEDURES 
The DOJ offers one mechanism, an Opinion Procedure, through which 
a company can receive guidance about whether a specific situation would 
violate the FCPA. These opinions, however, offer little precedential value. 
If a company believes it may run afoul of the FCPA, it may request an 
Opinion Procedure Release.141 The regulations provide that DOJ review 
must be specific to the company and not hypothetical.142 The opinion, 
generally issued within thirty days of submission, applies only to the parties 
who joined in the request and “shall have no application to any party which 
does not join in the request for the opinion.”143 Additionally, the opinion 
only addresses prospective conduct and does not apply to previous 
actions.144 Therefore, requests are only submitted prior to the transaction.145 
Perhaps more significantly, Opinion Procedures pose a problem 
because so few are released. In 2010, the DOJ issued three opinions and 
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after it only issued one in 2009.146 None of the three 2010 Opinion 
Procedures provided the name of the company requesting the Opinion, 
although there were limited descriptions of the companies and the 
transactions.147 The second release contained the most informative 
description; the requestor was a “U.S.-based microfinance institution (MFI) 
whose mission is to provide loans and other basic financial services to the 
world’s lowest-income entrepreneurs.”148 However, most companies choose 
not to disclose their identities,149 possibly in order to protect their activities. 
As a result, companies must hypothesize whether their situations are 
analogous to the requesting company’s. Compounding the inflexibility is 
the required thirty-day lead time in which a competitor may woo a 
prospective client. Additionally, if there is a fast breaking opportunity, then 
the company must decide whether to risk a potential violation or abandon a 
lucrative deal. 
Further, some companies are reluctant to request an Opinion Procedure 
Release as they fear it will put them on the agency’s radar.150 Although a 
company may always withdraw its request, it is possible that doing so will 
pique the DOJ’s interest in the company.151 These complications reduce the 
appeal of Opinion Procedure Releases and indicate that, in its current form, 
the tool’s disadvantages outweigh its advantages.  
B. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 
The prosecutions of Lucent Technologies (Lucent) in 2007 and 
UTStarcom (UTSI) in 2009 illustrate the necessity of standardized, clear 
guidance regarding promotional expenditures to ensure that the DOJ and 
SEC equally distribute punishment. The DOJ alleged that from 2000 to 
2003, Lucent Technologies spent over $10 million on 315 trips for 
approximately 1,000 Chinese government officials of state-owned 
enterprises to which Lucent wanted to sell its equipment.152 Lucent 
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classified these trips in its records as “factory inspections” or “training” 
despite no longer owning any factories for its customers to tour.153 These 
trips were primarily sightseeing excursions and included visits to 
Disneyland, Universal Studios, Washington, D.C., and New York City, and 
each trip cost between $25,000 and $55,000.154 These trips were requested 
and approved by senior Lucent Chinese officials and coordinated with 
Lucent’s Murray Hill, New Jersey office.155 
Furthermore, the non-prosecution agreement alleged that Lucent “paid 
or offered to pay for educational opportunities” for relatives of Chinese 
government officials.156 This included a payment of $71,000 to cover 
enrollment and living expenses in Thunderbird’s School of Management 
Training in Beijing, China for an employee of the Chinese government 
ministry. This employee was part of a committee that wielded some 
influence in selecting China’s mobile telecommunications platform.157 
Lucent recorded the payment as a marketing expense.158 In 2003, Lucent 
provided a paid internship for a Chinese government official’s daughter 
because Lucent viewed the official as its “key contact in China.”159 As a 
result, “Lucent spent over $5,000 to fund the internship and paid for the 
official’s daughter’s travel expenses, lodging expenses and a $3,600 
stipend,” which it also improperly recorded as marketing expenses.160 
Despite its blatant disregard of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions as 
well as the improperly recorded expenses, Lucent paid only a $1 million 
penalty and its non-prosecution agreement stipulated that the company 
would develop an internal compliance program.161 The DOJ agreed not to 
prosecute Lucent if it complied with the NPA’s requirements for a two-year 
term.162 Without admitting to the allegations, Lucent settled the SEC’s 
complaint with the entry of a permanent injunction and paid $1.5 million in 
civil penalties.163 Interestingly, although the facts indicate that the various 
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payments and trips were bribes, the DOJ did not charge it with anti-bribery 
violations.164 
C. UTSTARCOM 
UTSI is a Delaware corporation headquartered in California that 
designs, manufactures, and sells network equipment and handsets primarily 
for a Chinese market.165 The majority of UTSI’s employees and operations 
are located in China, and the company operates through UTS-China, its 
wholly-owned subsidiary.166 The SEC’s complaint alleged that between 
2002 and 2007, UTSI spent approximately $7 million on 225 trips for its 
customer’s employees to travel for training trips.167 The trips were typically 
two weeks and cost $5,000 per each of the customer’s employees and were 
primarily used for sightseeing rather than training.168 Further, in an attempt 
to garner business, UTSI paid more than $4 million in “marketing 
expenses” on seven different occasions between 2002 and 2004 for 
executive training programs in the United States that included a stipend 
between $800 to $3,000 per person.169 While trying to expand to Mongolia, 
UTSI authorized a $1.5 million payment to a Mongolian company to obtain 
a license from the Mongolian government; however, the records do not 
reflect what services were obtained from the license.170 Although UTSI 
recorded this payment as a license fee, the actual fee was only $50,000 and 
the consulting company used the balance to pay Mongolian government 
officials.171 Finally, on at least ten occasions between 2001 and 2005, UTSI 
provided or offered UTSI employment to government customers or their 
family members.172 By claiming that UTSI employed these individuals, 
UTSI could sponsor their permanent U.S. residency applications. In these 
applications, UTSI falsely stated that the individuals were full-time UTSI 
employees in New Jersey and enabled them to receive green cards.173 
As a result of these activities, UTSI was accused of violating the anti-
bribery and record-keeping statutes.174 In its NPA, UTSI agreed to pay $1.5 
million to settle the criminal charges against it and had to implement 
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compliance measures and refrain from illegal activity for three years.175 It 
also paid a $1.5 million fine for its violations of the record-keeping 
provision.176 
Despite the similarity in FCPA violations for travel and entertainment 
expenses, the resulting penalties were dissimilar. Although Lucent 
sponsored 315 trips to UTSI’s 225, while spending more total money than 
UTSI, Lucent avoided an anti-bribery violation.177 This is particularly 
curious because, according to the DOJ’s press release, UTSI self-reported 
the violations, but no similar mention is made about Lucent.178 Finally, 
although UTSI self-reported and its violations were less severe than 
Lucent’s, its fine was $500,000 more than Lucent’s. This disparity in 
penalties highlights both the unpredictability of fines and the need for rule-
based guidance regarding expenditures instead of the vague standard 
currently in force. 
V. THE NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING A RULE 
A. THE BENEFITS OF A RULE INSTEAD OF A STANDARD 
The FCPA’s reasonable and bona fide affirmative defense promulgates 
a standard by which companies seeking to pay promotional expenses may 
determine whether their conduct violates the anti-bribery provisions. 
Standard-based approaches, however, offer no concrete parameters, making 
it difficult for companies to be assured they are correctly applying the law. 
Further, the DOJ Opinion Procedure Releases are of limited utility because 
the opinion applies only to the specific conduct described therein and may 
not be used for precedent. Finally, without clear guidelines, penalties for 
violations lack consistency as demonstrated in the UTSI and Lucent cases. 
In fact, the Resource Guide does not provide novel insight into the Act. 
Instead, it appears to be a compilation of various enforcement actions and a 
summary of advice the legal community already deduced. These problems 
all illustrate the need for a rule-based FCPA, particularly regarding the 
reasonable and bona fide affirmative defense. 
The essential difference between a rule and a standard is that a rule 
specifies the law and penalties “in advance of the conduct to which it is 
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applied.”179 This differs from a standard because a standard “establishes 
general guidance to both the person governed and the person charged with 
applying the law but does not, in advance, specify in precise detail the 
conduct required or proscribed.”180 
The difficulty of interpreting and consistently applying the FCPA’s 
provisions illustrates the problem of expecting a standard to regulate 
frequently occurring conduct. As more businesses compete in the 
international arena, they will need to persuade potential customers of their 
products’ superiority over the competition’s. As a result, promotional 
expenses will likely increase. The current formulation of the affirmative 
defense as a standard is ineffective because there are few avenues through 
which a company may assess its behavior. A standard is effective when the 
regulated behavior does not occur frequently; however, FCPA prosecutions 
are increasing.181 
Second, when adjudication is used to regulate frequently occurring 
conduct, standards are useful because the precedent forms a basis for future 
enforcement proceedings.182 However, most FCPA enforcement actions 
against companies are settled either through deferred or non-prosecution 
agreements, which eliminates the opportunities of establishing precedent 
and creating judge-made parameters for the defense. Instead, practitioners 
have formulated what they believe are the rules for evaluating promotional 
expenditures, which may not reflect the DOJ’s and SEC’s analysis.183 
Although establishing a rule will create some problems, the advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages. A rule determining permissible conduct is 
preferable when many individuals engage in the conduct because 
individuals “may be better guided by a rule since the law’s content can be 
more readily ascertained.”184 In this case, a rule would allow businesses 
considering promotional expenditures to have a frame of reference for 
determining whether the expenditure was acceptable. If the FCPA’s 
affirmative defense provided better guidance about acceptable promotional 
expenditures, then legal compliance would probably increase because 
individuals could tailor their behavior to avoid noncompliance.185 In fact, 
clarifying FCPA expenditure rules might reduce the cost of obtaining legal 
advice as it would require less individualized analysis.186 This cost 
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reduction could potentially be important to small businesses that currently 
do not fully investigate their FCPA obligations or reject legitimate business 
activities for fear of running afoul of the FCPA.  
Rule based legislation may also be less expensive than a standards-
based approach. Of course, the legislature incurs an initial cost in 
developing and promulgating rules that is not encountered with 
standards.187 Government officials must determine how best to formulate 
the content of the law to maximize its utility and deter the targeted 
behavior.188 Yet, this initial outlay should ultimately result in increased 
savings as compared to standards-based regulation because, unlike with 
standards, the law’s content is more readily determinable.189 As a result of 
this increased certainty, individuals and adjudicators spend less time and 
money struggling to identify appropriate behavior.190 Further, it enables 
businesses to plan their conduct in advance as well as to understand the 
consequences of noncompliance.191 
Detractors may argue that rules are under-or-over inclusive.192 If the 
rule-based FCPA formulation is over-inclusive, it will deter legitimate 
promotional expenditures, while an under-inclusive formulation will fail to 
deter illegitimate payments.193 Yet, a closer examination reveals that these 
same complaints have lead to the failure of the FCPA’s current standards-
based formulation—some businesses reject legitimate opportunities and 
some companies mask illicit payments as promotional expenditures. 
Although standards allow for analyzing a broad range of factors and 
leave more discretion to the court, it is not clear which factors are 
considered when analyzing a violation.194 A rule may only capture a limited 
number of circumstances or elements of a violation, but it is possible that 
the DOJ or SEC focuses on a few factors when determining whether a 
violation occurred.195 As a result, rule-based regulation has the advantage of 
providing businesses with notice of what constitutes violative conduct and 
the resulting penalties. In contrast, the current standards-based formulation 
creates business-deterring ambiguity. 
Given the extent of enforcement activity and the frequency with which 
companies conduct business in markets with high potential for FCPA 
violations, a rule would provide greater guidance than a standard. 
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B. A POSSIBLE RULE FOR FCPA PROMOTIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Considering the increasing enforcement activity, it is likely that many 
different people are involved in determining whether a violation occurred 
and the appropriate enforcement action. Under a standards-based approach, 
these individuals impose their own analysis, which could result in a 
disparity in enforcement outcomes. Thus, a rule, albeit a complex one, 
would impose greater uniformity when determining whether a violation 
occurred. Additionally, a rule-based approach would clarify the range of 
potential fines, putting companies on notice of the repercussions for FCPA 
violations. A model for the FCPA rule might be found in the per diem 
schedule used for determining a federal employee’s allowances for hotel, 
food, and incidental expenses when traveling.196 This searchable schedule 
determines the allowance based on the city in which the person is traveling 
and the time of year.197 Further, if a city or county is not listed, then it 
receives the standard Government Services Administration rate for 
continental U.S. travel of $77 for lodging and $46 for meals and incidental 
expenses.198 These standard rates typically apply in areas where the federal 
employee community infrequently travels.199 The rates for the non-standard 
areas are areas of frequent travel and are reviewed on an annual basis.200 Per 
diem rates are established by a contractor-provided average daily rate of 
lodging located in the target area.201  
This system is certainly not perfect and in some high-cost areas it might 
not reflect the actual market value during a period when prices spike for 
only a week or two. However, the per diem system provides advantages 
through its flexibility both regionally and seasonally, and its specification of 
the acceptable amounts for travel. Additionally, it alleviates the need for 
every hotel or meal expense to be reviewed and adjudicated. 
A similar system might be adopted for determining appropriate 
promotional expenditures. The DOJ and SEC could develop a matrix that 
provides a maximum promotional expenditure value based on the rank of 
the official involved, the official’s country of origin or regional location, 
and perhaps the value of the contract at issue. The accounting procedures 
would remain the same, preventing a blanket payment of the maximum 
amount to the official. If the company felt that the rates were not acceptable 
to its particular situation, then it could request an Opinion Procedure as it 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See FY 12 Per Diem Files, GSA.GOV, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103168 (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2013) (follow “FY 12 Per Diem Files” hyperlink; then follow “FY 12 Per Diem 
Rates (Downloadable)” hyperlink). 
 197. Per Diem Rates, supra note 20. 
 198. Frequently Asked Questions, Per Diem, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov 
/portal/content/104208 (follow “What is the difference between non-standard areas and standard 
CONUS locations?” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. (follow “How are the CONUS per diem rates set for NSAs?” hyperlink). 
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may under the current system. Finally, officials would review the permitted 
payment figures at regular intervals to ensure they are consistent with 
private industry expectations. This new system would also include a 
schedule of maximum and minimum fines for a violation. The fines would 
be based on a percentage of the entire contract’s worth with increasing 
percentages linked to the number of violations and the period over which 
they occurred. Additionally, the expenditures would still have to be made 
for bona fide promotional activities without a corrupt intent. Thus, violators 
would be penalized for both the number of infractions and their duration. 
The initial costs of establishing this matrix would admittedly be 
considerable. To ensure the system’s effectiveness, a working committee 
would have to be formed that included officials from the DOJ and SEC, 
executives from a variety of industries, and country experts to create a 
realistic matrix. Undoubtedly, private industry and U.S. government 
officials would disagree about what constitutes reasonable expectations 
during business trips. This issue would be further compounded as culture 
greatly shapes expectations.  The DOJ and SEC would have to develop a 
timetable for rolling out the new system in stages as there would be a 
lengthy developmental and implementation process. Finally, there would be 
costs associated with promulgating and educating companies about the 
changes. 
Over the long term, however, the advantages of a rule-based system 
would outweigh the costs. As more companies engage in promotional 
expenditures, leading to more FCPA violations, a rule would reduce the 
business community’s uncertainty. A rule would enable businesses to plan 
promotional expenditures with certainty that they were not violating the 
FCPA, thereby increasing their flexibility. The two-tiered approach of 
determining expenditures under the government-provided rates or 
requesting an Opinion Procedure would give businesses an option of 
complying with the rates to enable it to move quickly or to wait an 
additional thirty days under the Opinion Procedure process in exceptional 
situations. Under this system, a company can evaluate how best to protect 
its interests while still complying with the law. 
The proposed system would ultimately reduce the costs of obtaining 
information as less interpretation and analysis would be involved to 
determine a promotional expenditure’s legitimacy. This point would be 
especially important for small businesses. Under this system, a small 
company could independently educate itself and obtain legal advice on only 
the most important questions. 
Finally, as DOJ and SEC resolve the FCPA’s ambiguity on promotional 
expenditures, it would no longer be a forum for making illicit payments. A 
company would know the penalties in advance, creating a more balanced 
system preventing disparate fines as in Lucent and UTSI. Although 
problems would still arise under this new system, the parameters a rule 
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imposes would offer some confidence to businesses. As a result, they will 
be able to better compete in the global market and have some security that 
they are not violating the FCPA. 
CONCLUSION 
It does not appear that prosecutions under the FCPA will abate, and as 
U.S. companies enter more markets, the potential for violations increases. 
Although compliance measures can deter illicit payments, it is not always 
possible to impose U.S. government expectations on employees operating 
under different cultural norms. Under the current standards-based system, 
little guidance exists about what the DOJ considers acceptable promotional 
expenditures, although these expenses play an important role in developing 
business relationships. Further, the penalties for violations are unclear and 
vary widely, with little explanation for these discrepancies. A rule-based 
system would alleviate many of these problems and encourage businesses 
to proactively arrange promotional activities within defined boundaries. 
Additionally, the FCPA’s ultimate goal of deterring illicit payments would 
be preserved while simultaneously imposing new restrictions on 
prosecutorial discretion. 
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